EDITORIAL

Amending the Ottawa
Convention: A Way Forward
With clearance deadlines for States Parties to the Ottawa Convention approaching or
having passed, and available humanitarian aid being spread among an exploding number of worthy activities, should mine-action programs be held to the stringent letter
of the Convention? The author posits that, with a simple solution, States Parties can
fulfill the spirit of the agreement while eliminating costly, time-consuming and inefficient clearance obligations.
by Dennis Barlow [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]

I

n his article in Issue 13.1 of this publication, Dr. Robert Keeley suggests an imaginative and altogether logical course of
action to enhance the Ottawa Convention—
amend it.1
For years, James Madison University’s Mine
Action Information Center has called for an
approach to mine action that would not sacrifice pragmatic plans and scarce resources
on the altar of an unrealistic, “mine free” approach to landmine clearance. The reasons to

Committee Meetings of the Ottawa Convention. The “mine free” approach derives from
Article 5, paragraph 1: “Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all
anti-personnel mines,” while the “impact free”
proponents base their argument on the Preamble, which sets as its goal “an end to suffering
and casualties” [emphasis added].2 The goal of
any strategic plan sets the path forward, and
mine action is no different. Such terms establish the measures of effectiveness and progress

Do you favor or oppose an amendment to the Mine
Ban Convention to clarify the endstate required
for clearance efforts? Tell us your opinion—take
the Ottawa Convention Amendment Survey at:
http://maic.jmu.edu
us have always been evident: In a world suffering from so many humanitarian, medical, postconflict and development issues, insisting on
the removal of every last landmine would dilute practical planning and management procedures, while requiring almost unimaginable
amounts of resources.
Which Endstate?

The debate among supporters of “mine free,”
“impact free” and “mine safe” endstates has
generally been relegated to the realm of coffee
breaks and free-form discussions at Standing
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to be achieved, and disagreements relating to
the proper endstate invariably result in confusion and dissention in policy as well as operational circles.
The obligation of the United Kingdom to help
clear the Falkland-Malvinas Islands has forced
the debate into the world of realpolitik. The
United Kingdom has been one of the staunchest supporters of the Ottawa Convention, yet has
both received and delivered harsh comments
during heated exchanges relating to its Article 5
obligations—and no wonder. Critics of the U.K.
argue that the convention is clear, and that the

U.K. government is required to “destroy or ensure the destruction of all
anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control.”2 At
the 9th Meeting of the States Parties,
British Ambassador John Duncan responded with some stern logic, observing that it would be unwise for his
country to spend US$100 million
to clear an area in the FalklandMalvinas Islands that has been
without landmine accidents for the
past 25 years. Clearly, he said, the
money could be better spent. The
U.K. observed that it was the spirit and not the letter of the Convention that it was upholding. This
assertion came as a thunderbolt in
that it confirmed what has been the
position of the United States and
others for a long time: Striving for
a true impact-free environment is
the most practical and logical way
to approach mine action.
Extension Requests

At the conclusion of the first decade of the Ottawa Convention, the
great majority of countries with
clearance deadlines (15 of the 17 in
2009) have requested an extension to
their Convention obligations. Therefore, we must ask several questions
regarding the failure to meet clearance deadlines:
1. Why have so many countries
had to request extensions?
2. As all 15 extension requests
were granted by member states,
will the international community (donors, international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, etc.) accept the
rationale and costs for extension requests and approvals?
3. What does this situation mean
for further support to affected
countries?

4. How will it affect the donors
providing financial support for
clearance activities?
5. How will it affect the need for
resources relating to development and humanitarian aid?
The CISR/MAIC believes that the
impetus for an amendment to provide the proper guidance for these efforts is found in the first 14 words of
the Convention: “Determined to put
an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel landmines.”2 Clearly the imperative to
relieve suffering trumps any particular operational methodology. We also
note a disturbing trend in discussions alluding to Article 5, paragraph
2, which states that “Each State Party
shall make every effort to identify all
areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines
are known or suspected to be emplaced”2 [emphasis added]—there
being an implication that not knowing of landmines may be a way out
of the political dilemma. To meet
the question honestly and frankly
seems to us the best recourse, rather than skirting the issue by fencing with words or playing legalistic
roulette as affected countries try to
satisfy the requirements of various
donors and stakeholders.
Time for an Amendment

We do not understand the controversy about addressing the question
of an amendment to the Convention. No one at the original meeting
ruled out the need for amendments
in the future, and Keeley points out
that the U.S. Constitution has grown
stronger—not weaker—through its
amendment process.1 Certainly the
framers of the Mine Ban Convention envisioned the potential to update and enhance the document by

inclusion of Article 13, which lays
out a very clear set of procedures to
amend it.
In light of countries being unable
to complete Article 5 clearance obligations and the confusing discrepancies between the terms found in
the Preamble and Article 5, we wonder why no State Party has suggested
an amendment to clarify this key issue and discuss it during an Amendment Conference.
See Endnotes, Page 77
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